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Missouri Supreme Court Clarifies: Siding
with Business Owners in Negligent Security
Actions May Have Been Wrong All Along
L.A. C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center Co., L.P.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Fear of criminal attack is a fact of life for most people, so they do their best
to take preventative measures to protect themselves and those they love. Thus,
while most parents would never allow their children to spend an evening in a
dark alley with their friends, most parents do feel comfortable dropping their
children off at a shopping mall for the night to socialize, shop, or watch movies.
Parents do this because they find comfort in knowing that their children will be
indoors in a well-lit area in the midst of other shoppers, storekeepers, and
security. The atmosphere of certain public places, such as shopping centers, has
traditionally made patrons feel safe and secure.
Up until now, if a patron was criminally attacked in a place of business such
as a shopping mall, Missouri courts generally did not side with a patron who
sued the owner of the premises.2 This was recently changed by the Missouri
Supreme Court's holding in L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center Co., L.P.,
in which the court held that a patron could sue as a third party beneficiary of the
contract between the shopping center and the security company, and the security
company had a duty to protect patrons from foreseeable attacks, and the attack
on the patron was foreseeable.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On March 15, 1997, twelve-year-old L.A.C. and her friend A.G. went to the
Ward Parkway Shopping Center to see a movie.3 After the movie, L.A.C. and
her friends congregated in a common area." L.A.C. then sat down on a bench in
front of J.M. Porters, a store in the mall, where she talked to a fifteen-year-old
boy she had met at the shopping mall the previous weekend.5 The boy lured
1. 75 S.W.3d 247 (Mo. 2002).
2. See Matthew J. Landwehr, Note, "Come One, ComeAll, but Watch Your Back!"
Missouri Sides with Business Owners in Negligent Security Action, 67 MO. L. REV. 59
(2002).
3. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 250.
4. Id.
5. L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., No. WD 58111,
2001 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 641, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2001), rev'd, 75 S.W.3d
247 (Mo. 2002).
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L.A.C. away from the group of friends by taking her purse down a hallway and
stopping so she could catch up.6 She pursued him and he demanded that she
give him a kiss before he would return her purse.7 She complied, giving him a
kiss and letting him give her a hickey on her neck.' After returning her purse,
however, he grabbed her and picked her up.9 He then carried her to a walkway
connecting the mall to the parking lot where he allegedly raped her.'"
L.A.C.'s friends did not intervene when the boy picked her up because the
boy was older and had a gun showing." Instead, L.A.C.'s friend A.G. went
downstairs and found an IPC International security guard who was patrolling the
mall.' 2 A.G. told the guard that her friend needed help.'3 She pointed to the
door through which the boy had carried L.A.C. and told the guard that the boy
had a gun.'4 Dismissing her, the guard said that the boy was only joking and the
guard left to attend to something else.'" A.G. found another guard, who also
dismissed her.'6 When A.G. finally saw L.A.C. again, L.A.C. "broke down" and
told A.G. that she had been raped."7 L.A.C. reported the rape to the police and
went to the hospital.' The boy was arrested the next day and eventually
convicted of rape by a juvenile court."
The owners, operators, and managers of the Ward Parkway Shopping
Center together comprise the "Ward Parkway Group."" G.G. Management, the
managers of the mall, contracted with IPC International Corp., a security
6. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 250.
7. Id.
8. L.A.C., 2001 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 641, at *5.





14. L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center Co., L.P., No. WD
58111, 2001 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 641, at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2001), rev'd, 75
S.W.3d 247 (Mo. 2002).
15. Id.
16. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 251. In A.G.'s earlier testimony at the juvenile
proceedings of the assailant she testified that she only contacted one IPC security guard.
Id. at 251 n.l.
/ 17. Id. at251.
18. Id.
19. Id. The defendants' version of the facts differed considerably. Id. at 251 n. 1.
The defendants contended that L.A.C. referred to her assailant as her boyfriend. Id. They
also contended that when A.G. saw her immediately after the incident she was "laughing
and giggling." Id.
20. Id. at 251. The Ward Parkway Shopping Center Company L.P. and W.S.C.
Associates, L.P. owned and operated the mall. Id. G.G. Management provided
management services for the mall. Id.
[Vol. 68
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company, to provide security at the mall. 2 ' L.A.C. sued Ward Parkway Group
and IPC International for negligence.22 She also sued G.G. Management and
IPC for breach of contract on the basis that she was a third party beneficiary of
their contract.23
The contract between G.G. Management and IPC included multiple terms
relevant to the present case. 24 First, according to the terms of the agreement, the
IPC security guards were authorized to arrest and detain people in order to
protect mall customers. 25 Further, the mall management and IPC agreed that they
together would determine the number of security guards necessary to "provide
adequate security at the mall."26 The contract also stated that security guards
were assigned the duty of making frequent rounds to check for safety hazards,
and to "[r]eport immediately to . . . the Manager any unusual incidents,
hazardous conditions, accidents, defects, suspicious activities, or criminal
activities observed during" their shifts. 27 The contract also provided that the
officers were to keep a log of all incidents that occurred during their shifts. 28
In turn, IPC bound its employees to a Policy and Procedures Manual that
it published for its employees.29 The manual stated that the management hired
IPC "to create a safe, orderly atmosphere in which customers may relax and shop
21. Id.
22. Id. at 253.
23. Id.
24. Id. 251.
25. Id. The contract provided: "[IPC] shall avoid making an arrest of any kind;
provided, however, the employees or agents of [IPC] may detain an individual when
necessary to protect either that individual or mall customers or employees from risk of
serious injury." Id. (emphasis omitted).
26. Id. Another provision of the contract provided:
Manager and Contractor shall agree upon the proper level of staffing needed
to provide adequate security to [the] mall. Upon agreement, the staffing level
shall be conclusively deemed for all purposes to be a material representation
by Contractor to Manager that the staffing level is one which will provide full
and adequate security to the Mall.
Id.
27. Id. at 251-52. The officers were to make rounds randomly of the common
areas, sidewalks, parking lots, and ring roads. Id. They were also to make motorized
patrols of the parking lots and ring roads. Id. at 252 n.2.
28. Id. at 252. The IPC incident reports within three years of the incident contained
descriptions of multiple crimes, both violent and non-violent, which purportedly occurred
at the Ward Parkway Shopping Center. Id. at 253. The reports included one sexual
assault, one robbery and abduction, thirteen armed or attempted armed robberies, nine
strong-arm robberies, four aggravated assaults, and twenty-eight simple assaults. Id.
Many of these crimes involved female victims. Id. at 254. Further, the executive vice
president of IPC stated that rape was a major concern of the company. Id. at 255.
29. Id. at 252.
2003]
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without undue concern for their own safety."" The manual declared that it was
IPC's "ultimate goal" to ensure the continued patronage of the customers.31
Furthermore, a training manual also distributed by IPC to its employees stated
that "[tihe personal safety of yourself, fellow Officers, customers and tenants to
the mall is absolute priority at all times."32
L.A.C. made two primary claims. First, L.A.C. sued G.G. Management and
IPC for breach of contract as a third party beneficiary of the management and
security contract.3 Second, she sued the Ward Parkway Group, G.G.
Management, and IPC for negligence.3" Following discovery, Ward Parkway
Group moved for summary judgment.35 IPC moved for judgment on the
pleadings.3 6 In deciding whether to grant these motions, the trial court found that
the defendants owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from the criminal acts of a
third party, and, therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.37 L.A.C. appealed the judgments against her on her negligence
claims against both defendants and her contract claims against IPC.3" On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's decision, holding that:
(1) the rape was foreseeable; (2) the plaintiff could bring suit as a third party
beneficiary because the contract between G.G. and IPC "clearly and directly
provided for the safety of the mall's business invitees"; and (3) the security
company had a duty to business invitees to exercise reasonable care when
providing security services. 3
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Negligent Security Claim
In general, storekeepers or proprietors are not liable to their customers for
the criminal actions of third persons on their premises.40 Because there is a
30. Id.
31. Id.





37. Id. at 250.
38. Id. at 255. She did not appeal the judgment on her contract claim against G.G.
Id.
39. Id. at 250.
40. 62A AM. JUR. 2D, Premises Liability § 513 (1990 & Supp. 2002); see also Ross
v. Papler, 68 F. Supp. 2d. 790 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (noting rumors of illegal prostitution by
the tenants are not enough to put the building owner on notice of imminent criminal
attacks when there were no prior criminal incidents in the vicinity); Martinko v. H-N-W
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special relationship between business owners and customers (who are invitees),
however, a duty may be imposed on a proprietor to guard customers against
harm inflicted by third parties." Whether the duty is imposed turns on
foreseeability 2  Harm to customers may be foreseeable if a business
establishment is considered one that would likely attract harmful criminal
conduct43 or if the proprietor of a business was put on notice of criminal activity
because there were prior similar criminal incidents on the premises." Police
reports, security reports, and crime studies of the area are all used to prove that
there have been prior similar incidents, making future harm foreseeable.45
There are at least four tests employed by courts in the U.S. to determine the
issue of foreseeability.4 The first, and most stringent, test is the "specific harm"
test.47 Under this approach, a criminal act by a third person is only foreseeable
if a business owner had notice of the specific danger immediately prior to the
assault.4" In Virginia, for instance, the proprietor must know that an individual
on the premises has a violent history and poses an "imminent probability of
harm" to business patrons before a duty to protect them is imposed 9.4  The
second test, the "prior-similar incidents rule," is less stringent ° and requires only
Associates, 393 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1986) (holding that when there is no evidence of prior
violent criminal acts on the premises, evidence that criminal acts occurred in other
shopping malls throughout the country in which the defendant owned an interest was not
sufficient to establish foreseeability).
41. Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. 1988).
42. Id. at 62; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965),
which states:
If the place or character of [the proprietor's] business, or his past experience,
is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on
the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may
be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably
sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
43. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62.
44. Id. In Madden, six strong-arm robberies, six armed robberies, one assault, and
one purse snatching in the three years prior to the assault on the plaintiff were found
sufficient to put the defendant on notice and create a duty to protect the plaintiff against
sexual assault. Id.; see also Richardson v. QuikTrip Corp., 81 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. Ct. App.
2002) (holding two strong-arm robberies one week before attack, one robbery, five
larcenies, three incidents of vandalism, deviant behavior in a restroom within five years,
and poor location as sufficient to put proprietor on notice).
45. 42 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 173 (1985).
46. L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247,256 (Mo.
2002).
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Burns v. Johnson, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Va. 1995).
49. Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Va. 2001).
50. L.A. C., 75 S.W.3d at 256; see also Lauersdorfv. Supermarket Gen. Corp., 657
2003]
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that a defendant have notice of a sufficient number of prior similar criminal acts
before a duty is imposed.5 Courts using this approach vary as to how similar to
the instant offense the prior incidents must be to establish foreseeability. 2 As
a result, some courts have molded the prior similar incidents rule into a third
approach to determining foreseeability-a balancing test." Under this third test,
a court considers, among other factors, the probability and magnitude of harm
weighed against the costs and burdens of preventing the harm.54 The final test,
the "totality of the circumstances" test, is similar.55 Under this test, if the
proprietor has reason to anticipate criminal conduct, either from prior incidents
or the location and nature of his business, he may be held to have a duty to
protect his customers if the frequency and severity of criminal conduct on his
premises exceeds the norm.56
In Missouri, the definitive decision regarding how to determine if criminal
acts by third parties were foreseeable to a business proprietor is Madden v. C &
KBarbecue. 37 Madden involved kidnapings from restaurant and shopping center
parking lots." In Madden, the court refused to adopt any single version of the
foreseeability tests contrary to the lower courts' later attempts at classifying the
decision.59 Instead, the court used a traditional negligence standard.6 Thus,
N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
51. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 256.
52. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'shp, 937 S.W.2d 891, 899 (Tenn. 1996).
53. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 256; see also McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 901.
54. McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 901. The court stated:
[S]everal factors are to be considered in deciding whether a risk is an
unreasonable one, thereby giving rise to a duty. "Those factors include the
foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring; the possible
magnitude of the potential harm or injury; the importance or social value of
the activity engaged in by defendant; the usefulness of the conduct to
defendant; the feasibility of alternative, safer conduct and the relative costs
and burdens associated with that conduct; the relative usefulness of the safer
conduct; and the relative safety of alternative conduct."
Id. (quoting McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)).
55. See Seibert v. Vic Regnier Bldgs., Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1339-40 (Kan. 1990).
56. Id.
57. 758 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1988).
58. Id. at 61.
59. L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., .75 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Mo.
2002); see also Timothy A. Reuschel, Here's Your Burrito and Watch Your Back: Does
Missouri Really Want to Hold Businesses LiableforAttacks on Patrons?, 65 MO. L. REV.
255, 258 (2000) (noting that "[i]n Madden, [Missouri] did not explicitly adopt the
'totality of the circumstances' test or the 'prior similar incidents' test for foreseeabiliy.").
But see Wood v. Centermark Props., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 517, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(categorizing the Madden rule as a prior specific incidents test in the Eastern District of
Missouri); Becker v. Diamond Parking, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
[Vol. 68
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establishing foreseeability in Missouri involves conventional tort law analysis,
in which the main focus is on whether there is sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable person would have foreseen harm to patrons.6' If harm to these
invitees is reasonably foreseeable, the defendant has a duty to protect the invitees
from harm inflicted by unknown third parties.62 The most important evidence in
this examination is whether there were prior similar incidents that would put a
reasonable person on notice of this harm.63 Although Madden made clear that
Missouri has not specifically adopted the prior similar incidents test, the number
of occurrences and their similarity to the incident in question are the primary
factors considered in determining foreseeability in Missouri.64 Stated generally,
violent crimes are foreseeable if other violent crimes have occurred on the
premises.6"
B. Contract Claims of Third Party Beneficiaries
As a general rule, a third person may enforce a contractual obligation made
for her benefit as a third party beneficiary66 and can maintain an action for breach
of the contract even though she is not privy to the contract.67 To benefit from
a contract, a third party must be a "primary beneficiar[y]," although the
contracting parties need not have had the benefit of the third party as their
(categorizing Madden as a totality of the circumstances test in the Western District of
Missouri); Landwehr, supra note 2, at 73 (characterizing Madden as a prior violent
crimes test).
60. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257.
61. Smith v. Archbishop of St. Louis, 632 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
62. Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. 1988).
63. See id. at 62.
64. Hudson v. Riverport Performance Arts Ctr., 37 S.W.3d 261, 264-65 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000); see also Wood v. Centermark Props., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).
65. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62 n.2. There is some disagreement as to what
qualifies as the premises. Wood v. Centermark Properties excludes from the
foreseeability analysis crimes which occur indoors when the crime resulting in injury to
the plaintiff occurred in the parking lot outdoors. Wood, 984 S.W.2d at 524.
66. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 435 (1991 & Supp. 2002) ("This concept, originally
an exception to the rule that no claim can be sued upon contractually unless it is a
contract between the parties to the suit, has... ceased to simply be an exception, but is
recognized as an affirmative rule, generally known as the third-party beneficiary
doctrine."); see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS 55 § 1 (1978 & Supp. 2002). See
generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1358
(1992).
67. Andes v. Albano, 853 S.W.2d 936, 942 (Mo. 1993).
2003]
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primary goal in contracting. 6 The terms of the contract must articulate an
intention to benefit an "identifiable person or class" of which the third party is
a part.69 Whether there was an intention to benefit the third party is evidenced
by the situation of the parties, the purpose of the agreement, and the
circumstances surrounding the agreement.7" If the parties intended the contract
to benefit a third party, therefore, the courts generally agree that the third party
has a right of action and reject the normal requirements of consideration and
privity.7
1. Types of Third Party Beneficiaries
Under Missouri law, a contract can benefit a third party as a donee,
creditor, or an incidental beneficiary, depending on the purpose of the contract.7"
If the purpose of the contract is to make a gift to the third party or to give him a
right against the promisor, he is a donee beneficiary.73 If the contract implies a
duty of the promisee to the third person and performance of the contract will
satisfy that duty, the third person is a creditor beneficiary.74 A contract of this
kind usually calls for performance to be rendered directly to the beneficiary, but
this is not necessarily so." Finally, if the third party beneficiary is neither a
creditor beneficiary nor a donee beneficiary, she is an incidental beneficiary.76
What sort of beneficiary a person is considered to be is important because, under
68. Id.
69. Terre Du Lac Ass'n v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206,213 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
70. Black & White Cabs of St. Louis, Inc. v. Smith, 370 S.W.2d 669,675 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1963).
71. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 452 (1991).
72. Kansas City N.O. Nelson Co. v. Mid-Western Constr. Co. of Mo., 782 S.W.2d
672, 677 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
73. Id.; see also Terre Du Lac Ass 'n, 737 S.W.2d at 213 (citing RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) (1932) ("A person is a donee beneficiary if the purpose of the
promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is 'to make
a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some
performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the
beneficiary."').
74. Kansas City N.O. Nelson Co., 782 S.W.2d at 677; see also Terre Du Lac
Ass 'n, 737 S.W.2d at 213 (citing RESTATEMENTOF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b) (1932))("The
person is a creditor beneficiary if the 'performance of the promise will satisfy an actual
or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary."').
75. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 cmt. d (1932).
76. Id. See Terre Du Lac Ass', 737 S.W.2d at 213 (citing RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 133(1)(c) (1932)) ("[A] person is an incidental beneficiary if he is neither
a donee noi a creditor beneficiary.").
[Vol. 68
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Missouri law, only creditor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries may recover as
third party beneficiaries to a contract."
In contrast to Missouri law, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has done
away with the classification of beneficiaries as creditor, donee, or incidental.78
Instead, beneficiaries are classified only as intended or incidental. 79 A party is
an intended beneficiary if "recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties" and either the
promisee has an obligation to pay money to the beneficiary or the promised
performance is intended to benefit the beneficiary.8
2. Privity
Historically, parties not privy to a contract have not been able to use duties
created under that contract as a basis for a tort claim, but rather only contract
claims.8 When a separate duty arises out of the contract, however, tort liability
can attach." The terms of the contract and the circumstances determine if there
is a duty.3 A duty is created if the circumstances and contract terms indicate that
the defendant "assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to the
plaintiff." 4 Importantly, in Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator, the Missouri Supreme
Court recognized an independent duty when a contract involves the safety of
another person.85 In Westerhold v. Carrol, however, the court cautioned that this
exception to the privity requirement should be limited to avoid exposing parties
77. Id.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Ch. 14, Intro. Note (1981).
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981).
:81. See Roddy v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 15 S.W. 1112, 1114 (Mo. 1891); Kohnle v. Paxton,
188, S.W. 155, 157 (Mo. 1916); Lahtinen v. Cont'! Bldg. Co., 97 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Mo.
193,6); John Deere Co. of St. Louis v. Short, 378 S.W.2d 496, 503 (Mo. 1964).
82. John Deere Co. of St. Louis, 378 S.W.2d at 503.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
84. Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 556 N.E.2d 1093, 1096
(N.Y. 1990).
1 85. Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Co., 262 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Mo. 1953) (contract
between plaintiff s employer and an elevator repair company). The court stated:
[W]hatever it was defendant undertook to do which it knew or should have
known or foreseen would affect plaintiff s safety, the defendant had the duty
to do it carefully.... [A] defendant, by entering into a contract, may place
himself in such a relation toward third persons as to impose upon him an
obligation to act in such a way that they will not be injured.
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to unlimited liability, and whether the exception applies should be determined




In L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center Co., L.P., the Missouri
Supreme Court held that summary judgment granted in favor of the Ward
Parkway Group defendants should be reversed because the Ward Parkway Group
owed a duty to its business invitees to protect the invitees against violent
criminal acts by third parties." The court began by discussing the various
methods other courts use to determine the foreseeability of criminal acts and,
therefore, whether the proprietor is liable for the criminal acts of unknown third
persons.88 The court noted the specific harm test, the prior similar incidents rule,
the balancing test, and the totality of the circumstances test. The court
emphasized that Missouri decidedly does not adopt any single version of the
foreseeability tests.89 The court explained that fifteen years ago, in Madden, the
court followed the "traditional principles of the law of negligence" and did not
adopt a specific test to establish foreseeability, though there was much
speculation in the lower courts as to how to catagorize its decision." Instead of
adopting a particular test, the court said that a plaintiff must show that a
reasonable person in the proprietor's circumstances would anticipate danger and
take measures to protect invitees."1 The court noted that prior violent crimes on
the premises would make a reasonable person anticipate danger and, thus, would
likely impose a duty on a proprietor.9 2 In saying all of this, the court rejected the
inconsistent categorizations adopted by the appellate courts and reiterated the
86. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 77-78 (Mo. 1967). Many other states
have similarly held that a security company assumes a duty to protect the safety of others
when it enters a security contract. See Brown v. Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc., 679 S.W.2d
307, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 170-71
(Minn. 1989); Jones v. Tokhi, 535 N.W.2d 46,48-49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Prof'l Sports,
Inc. v. Gillette Sec., Inc., 766 P.2d 91, 93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Eaves Brooks Costume
Co., Inc., 556 N.E.2d at 1096; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A
(1965).
87. L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 259 (Mo.
2002).
88. Id. at 256.
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general standard for foreseeability set out in Madden.93 With this standard, the
court noted it had more leeway to adapt duty and breach to the case at hand,
without advancing the implication that a business owner is the insurer of
invitees' safety.94
The court then explained how traditional tort law applies to cases involving
liability of a proprietor for the actions of third parties. In any tort case, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant had a duty to use reasonable measures to protect
the plaintiff and that the defendant breached that duty causing injury to the
plaintiff.95 Furthermore, the court stated that, in order to establish a duty, a
plaintiff must show that it was foreseeable that something was likely to occur
that would harm the plaintiff.96 The court then enumerated the general rule that
there is generally not a duty to protect against the criminal acts of third persons
because these acts are generally not foreseeable.97 The court then explained,
however, that when a plaintiff and the defendant have a special relationship, like
that of business owner and invitee, an exception to this rule exists.9" In these
cases, a duty is imposed if the harm to the invitee was foreseeable.99 As the court
pointed out, a plaintiff does not have to show that the specific type of harm
suffered was foreseeable. Rather, she must show that, in general, a reasonable
person would have foreseen harm and taken measures to protect business
invitees.' ° Given all of this, the court concluded by stating the general rule that
violent crimes are foreseeable if there have been other violent crimes on the
premises."'
The court then moved on to its analysis of the case at hand. The court
began by stating that there were enough violent incidents on the premises for
L.A.C. to establish a question of foreseeability sufficient to avoid summary
judgment. 2 The court noted that, within the three years prior to the incident,
seventy-five violent crimes had occurred on the mall property."3 Sixty-two
93. Id. at 258.




98. Id. The court also noted another exception to the rule, not applicable in the
instant case. If a particular person on the premises of a business is known to be violent
or dangerous or conducts himself in a manner indicating such, the business owner will
have a duty to protect invitees in this case as well. Id.
99. Id. at 258.
100. Id.
101. Id. Violent crimes include "robbery, assault, burglary, stealing, arson,
abduction, murder, sexual assault and rape." Id.
102. Id. at 258-59.
103. Id. at 258.
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percent of these crimes involved female victims and included abduction, sexual
assault, and robbery. 4 Further, the court noted that the mall security director
stated that he believed that the mall had a duty to protect against violent crime
and IPC's vice president stated that rape was a security concem for the mall." 5
Because the incident reports and the defendants' testimony demonstrated that the
defendants were aware of the past crimes on the premises, the court found that
future crimes of the same nature were foreseeable.0 6 Thus, the court concluded,
it would be reasonable for ajury to find that the defendants had a duty to protect
invitees such as L.A.C. from such harm. 10 7
The court then began its analysis of L.A.C.'s contract claim against IPC.
First, the court stated that L.A.C.'s claim rested upon whether she was a third
party beneficiary to the contract between the mall and IPC. ' 8 A third party
beneficiary, the court stated, is one whom the contracting parties intended as the
primary beneficiary.0 9 The intention of contracting parties should be taken from
the document itself, the court noted, but if such an intention is unclear a court
may look to the surrounding circumstances."0 The contract must "express
directly and clearly an intent to benefit an identifiable person or class" of which
the party claiming to be a primary beneficiary is a member."'
The court next examined the contract between the mall and IPC. The court
noted that, under the contract, IPC security officers were empowered to detain
suspects in order to protect mall customers from injury inflicted by suspects and
104. Id. Crimes "on the premises" are included in the Madden test for
foreseeability. Id. at 258 n.10. This would include crimes in the parking lot or areas
adjacent to the mall. Id. The defendant tried to limit the introduction of evidence
concerning crimes inside the mall and exclude those in the parking lot, but the court
disagreed with this limitation because L.A.C. alleged that her abduction occurred inside
the mall while the rape occurred outside the mall in a walkway leading to the parking lot.
1d. at 258-59. The defendant also tried to exclude evidence of robberies, escaping
suspects, and other altercations, arguing that these were not indicative of the future"
occurrence of a rape, but the court stated that these were exactly the type of acts that




107. Id. The court noted that it only held that a duty existed and they did not
consider the extent of the duty. Id. at 259 n. 12. The court stated that the duty may range
from proper lighting to installing security systems or contracting with a security company.
Id.
108. Id. at 260.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Terre Du Lac Ass'n v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206, 213
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
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that the contract twice mentioned the steps that would be taken to provide
adequate security. 2 The court also noted that the security guards were supposed
to make frequent rounds and report any criminal or suspicious activities,
hazardous conditions, or accidents by reporting to management and entering the
incidents into a log book." 3 In turn, as the court observed, IPC agreed to bind
its employees to these regulations and provide "full and adequate security" for
the mall." 4 Thus, the court concluded that the purpose of the contract between
the mall and IPC was to protect customers from violent crime, and, therefore,
those customers, including the plaintiff, were creditor beneficiaries. 1
5
The court also addressed whether a tort duty by one of the contracting
parties to the third party could arise from the contract. The court stated that, in
general, a contract cannot give rise to a tort duty, but in Missouri, an exception
exists if the contract involves the safety of other persons." 6 The court noted,
citing decisions from other states and lower courts, that a security company
assumes a duty to ensure the safety of third persons when it enters into a security
contract."' The court said that the contract at hand not only set out a general
duty to protect customers from harm but also that a specific duty arose when
L.A.C.'s friend approached the two mall security guards seeking help."'
According to the court, once the security had notice of the criminal incident, the
issue of foreseeability disappeared." 9 Thus, the question surrounding the duty
to protect dissipated and the business owner owed the standard reasonable duty
to his customers. Accordingly, the court held that L.A.C. had standing to sue in
tort for breach of the security contract between IPC and the mall. 2 '
B. The Dissent
Chief Justice Stephen Limbaugh disagreed with all of the majority's
findings. He expressed concern that the majority's holding would swallow the
general rule that proprietors generally have no duty to protect their customers
from the criminal acts of unknown third persons.' 2 ' Chief Justice Limbaugh
thought that the prior incidents relied on by the majority were so dissimilar to the
abduction and rape of the plaintiff that there was not a sufficient basis for
112. Id. at 260-61.
113. Id. at 261.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 262.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 263.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 263-64 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
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concluding harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable.' 22 He also stated that a
distinction should be made between crimes occurring inside the mall and crimes
occurring in the parking lot because in the parking lot patrons can be isolated and
an attack is easier to make.'23 He reasoned that most of the prior crimes were
dissimilar and he distinguished the only sexual assault listed by the majority on
the ground that the perpetrator was a mall employee, not an unknown third
person.'24 Chief Justice Limbaugh also distinguished Madden from the current
case by noting that, in Madden, there had been twelve recent robberies of
business patrons.'25
Chief Justice Limbaugh criticized the majority's failure to cite Wood v.
Centermark Properties, the only Missouri case to address mall owners'
liability.'26 In Wood,'27 the Missouri Court of Appeals found no liability on the
part of mall owners for the abduction of the plaintiff from a parking lot when the
crimes produced by the plaintiff to establish forieseeability were mostly purse
snatchings and robberies. 2 ' Chief Justice Limbaugh stated that because these
crimes were not sufficient to establish foreseeability in Wood, the similar
circumstances in L.A. C. would also be insufficient to establish foreseeability.'29
Hence, he stated that he would not impose a duty on the mall owners in the
instant case because injury to the plaintiff was not foreseeable." 0
Turning to the contract claim, Chief Justice Limbaugh then stated that the
plaintiff could not be a third-party beneficiary if the court held in the negligence
case that there was no duty. ' A creditor beneficiary is given that status because
performance of the promise by the promisor satisfies a duty the promisee owed
to the third party.'32 If the mall owners owed no duty to the plaintiff, then the
plaintiff could not be a creditor beneficiary. 3 a Chief Justice Limbaugh also
pointed out longstanding precedent in Missouri that a party "not privy to a
contract" cannot use the duties created by the contract as a basis for a tort.34 He
rebutted the majority's application of the exception set forth in Wolfneyer with
the court's language in Westerhold in which the court held that the Wofneyer
122. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 265 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
127. Wood v. Centermark Properties, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
128. Id. at 524-25.
129. LA.C., 75 S.W.3d at 265 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 266 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
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exception was a narrow one, to be used when there is a close relationship
between a third party and the contracting parties.'35 Chief Justice Limbaugh
stated that the result in L.A. C. is exactly what the court forbade in Westerhold.36
V. COMMENT
In L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Center, Co., L.P., the Missouri
Supreme Court did not enlarge the exception to the general rule that a business
owes no duty to its patrons to protect them from crimes by third parties when it
heId that shopping mall owners have a duty to protect patrons from such criminal
acts when it is foreseeable that those patrons might be injured. Instead, the court
merely revived the special facts and circumstances exception established in
Madden. Before the Madden decision, exceptions to the general rule were
limited to cases in which frequent and recent crimes by unknown assailants had
occurred on the premises."7 This was known as the "violent crimes
exception."'3 Madden, however, rejected a strict approach and left the
imposition of duty open for the court to decide in each case, after considering all
of the circumstances, by following an ordinary negligence standard. Even so,
since Madden, the lower courts have generally found that landowners and
proprietors owe no duty to invitees.'39 Though some may say the lower courts
135. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting); see also Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Co., 262
S.W.2d 18, 22 (Mo. 1953) (holding that a defendant can enter into a contract and place
himself in a position in which he will have to protect the third party).
136. L.AC., 75 S.W.3d at 266 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting); see also Westerhold
v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 77-79 (Mo. 1967) (limiting the Wolfmeyer exception to cases
in which the third party and the contracting parties had a close relationship so as to shield
parties from "unlimited liability to an unlimited number of persons").
137. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 266 (citing Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d
270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
138. Id. at 263-64 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. See Wood v. Centermark Properties, 984 S.W.2d 517, 523-24 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding no special relationship between mall owner and injured); Hudson
v. Riverport Performance Arts Ctr., 37 S.W.3d 261,264-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
insufficient similar attacks to provide notice of attack on plaintiff); Wright v. St. Louis
Produce Mkt., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 404,409-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding prior incidents
not sufficiently similar); Knop v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 988 S.W.2d 586, 589-90 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding defendant had no duty because crimes were neither sufficiently
similar nor numerous); Moreland v. Farren-Davis, 58 S.W.3d 5, 10-11 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001) (holding landlord did not owe duty to tenant; landlord/tenant relationship not
special enough for the special relationship exception); Groce v. Kansas City Spirit, 925
S.W.2d 880, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996), overruled by Richardson v. QuikTrip Corp., 81
S.W.3d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
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ignored the Madden decision, 4 ' the Missouri Supreme Court characterized the
inconsistent lower rulings as misinterpretations of the Madden decision.'4'
Included in these misconstrued decisions is Wood,'42 which the dissent used as
the main case supporting the proposition of duty.'43 Thus, L.A.C. merely clarifies
a past Missouri Supreme Court ruling and does not overrule longstanding
Missouri precedent, as was stated by the dissent. Rather, the court noted the
utility of the general tort law's flexible standard over the more rigid approaches
taken by other states.
44
The court in L.A.C. also held that the plaintiff could sue in tort for a duty
arising under a contract as a third party beneficiary of the contract.' 45 This
decision is also consistent with prior rulings, though there is less precedent in
this area. The court made its decision on the general contract principles of third
party beneficiaries and applied the principles to the terms of the contract.4 6 The
holding does not create any new law, as Missouri's law on third party
beneficiaries is already established.'47 Instead, the decision rests within the
exception created in Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator 48 that a contract can create a
duty to a third party if the contract involves the safety of a third party. 149 This is
not the first time in Missouri a tort duty to a third party has arisen from a contract
between a proprietor and a security company,' 0 and such a duty has been upheld
in many other states as well.'
140. See Richardson, 81 S.W.3d at 63.
141. L.AC., 75 S.W.3d at 258. The court characterized the discrepancy between
the lower rulings and the Madden decision as'being one of misunderstanding and not
blatant defiance. Id.
142. Id. see also Richardson, 81 S.W.3d at 63 n.9.
143. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 265-66.
144. Id. at 258.
145. Id. at 262.
146. Id. at 260-62.
147. See generally Andes v. Albano, 853 S.W.2d 936 (Mo. 1993); Terre Du Lac
Ass'n v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Kansas City N.O.
Nelsson Co. v. Mid-Westem Constr. Co. of Mo., 782 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
148. 262 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1953).
149. Id. at 22.
150. See Brown v. Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984) (appealed on other grounds at 731 S.W.2d 291) (holding that a customer shot
in the supermarket parking lot by an unknown assailant could be a third party beneficiary
under the contract between the security company and the supermarket).
151. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 170 (Minn. 1989); Jones
v. Tokhi, 535 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Prof I Sports, Inc. v. Gillette Sec.,
Inc., 766 P.2d 91, 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Eaves Brooks Costume Co., Inc. v. Y.B.H.
Realty Corp., 556 N.E.2d 1093, 1096 (N.Y. 1990). But see Bizien v. Port Auth., 577 F.
Supp. 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Burton v. DeKalb County 434 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. App. 1993);
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The dissent pointed to Westerhold v. Carroll as precedent for the
proposition that a party not privy to a contract cannot use the duties created
under the contract as a basis for a tort suit. ' The Westerhold decision, however,
merely held that whether a party to a contract would be liable to a third party
beneficiary was a policy matter requiring the court to consider many factors.'
It urged limiting the Wolfmeyer exception but did not narrow it to a point of non-
existence.'54 It is left open to the court to decide when to apply the exception,
using the factors outlined in the case.'55
The opinion would have been more clear if the court had adopted the
Restatement standard for third party beneficiary classification. The Restatement
classifies third party beneficiaries as either intended beneficiaries or incidental
beneficiaries.'56 Intended beneficiaries can recover and incidental beneficiaries
cannot.' Adopting this approach would eliminate the possibly confusing
analysis the court goes through to determine that the plaintiff is a creditor
beneficiary and, thus, would leave less wiggle room for the lower courts in
similar cases. After the mischief that occurred with the Madden decision, the
court might want to limit the opportunity the lower courts have to make a finding
of law that keeps the plaintiff s case from the jury.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Limbaugh's logic for finding that there was no
duty is questionable. He argued against including the parking lot crimes in the
evaluation of whether there were sufficient similar crimes to establish
foreseeability.' He pointed out that people are more exposed and more easily
isolated in a parking lot than inside the mall and, thus, it is an attractive location
for violent crime. Thus, Chief Justice Limbaugh argued that a distinction must
be made between indoor and outdoor crime, with the parking lot crimes excluded
Jones v. Williams, 408 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
152. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 262. See Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 77-79
(Mo. 1967).
153. Westerhold, 419 S.W.2d at 81.
154. See id.
155. Id. The court stated:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing
of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)).
156. See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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from the foreseeability analysis." 9 He refuted the majority's reasoning for
including the parking lot crimes, that the crimes happened both inside and
outside, by saying that the walkway where the rape happened is distinguished
from the parking lot because the walkway is secluded and for employee use only.
However, if secluded walkway crimes, isolated parking lot crimes, and indoor
crimes are distinguishable, then eventually secluded indoor crimes in bathrooms
and walkways, and perhaps crimes in specific stores, would be distinguishable
as well. If that were to happen, the only way a plaintiff could recover is if an
identical crime at an identical location happened in the recent past. Nothing else
would, in the eyes of the court, put proprietors on notice that patrons might be
injured on their premises. This formulation serves to protect even the most
negligent proprietors with the technicalities of the prior similar incidents rule.
Although Chief Justice Limbaugh raised no issue with the adoption by the
majority of a general tort standard of evaluation, the analysis he imposed
suggests something very similar to the rigid prior similar incidents rule explicitly
rejected by the court in Madden.
Technically the case does not lay down any new law but instead reinforces
existing law. Instead of restricting themselves to the application of rigid rules,
the lower courts will have to recognize that in Missouri, proprietors have a
special relationship with customers and, thus, are very much within the
Wolfmeyer exception. Without the restrictions of the prior similar incidents or
other rules, the courts will give more weight to crimes and circumstances which
bear on foreseeability but were not applicable under those tests. This will make
it easier for a plaintiff to get her case to a jury and will expand the scope of the
proprietor's duty. There may no longer be the one "free" crime that proprietors
get under the prior similar incidents rule. 6 ' Instead, they will be liable for any
harm that a reasonable person would have protected against.
VI. CONCLUSION
In L.A.C., the Missouri Supreme Court held that the standard for
determining foreseeability of criminal acts that injure invitees is a general tort
standard and not one of the more rigid standards previously used by the lower
Missouri courts. This may have the result of wrenching the foreseeability issue
from the judge's hands and more frequently making it a question of fact for the
jury. The court also may have created a new cause of action by reviving an old
exception in finding that the plaintiff was a third party beneficiary of the security
contract between the shopping center and the security company. In doing so, the
159. Id.
160. The first crime on the premises will never subject the owner to liability
because, by definition, there were no prior crimes to establish foreseeability. Landwehr,
supra note 2, at 74.
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court overturned the general policy of the lower Missouri courts to side with
landowners and proprietors and opened the door for plaintiffs in negligent
security cases. Whether this simply allows rightful plaintiffs to recover or makes
business owners' responsibilities unproductively burdensome remains to be seen.
It may be that, in the end, the added cost of security and possibly higher
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